36 uses of the four letter word LOUS in Boo 7 o the Re pub l i c Ρεπουμπλ Ρεπουμπλιάνοι Ρεπουμπλιάνων

ωνε 

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is

the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the

journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at

your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is

that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when

seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord

of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is

the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

Τώο

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to

human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire

of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man,

misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become

accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about

the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who

have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

Θεραπεία Φουρ Φιβε

Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise

from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's

eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is

perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of

the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to

the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and

he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there

will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the

den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a

knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Σεβέν Ειγητ Νινε Των

Very true.

And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not

implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is

looking away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.

And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are

not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the of wisdom more than anything else

contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or,

on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen

eye of a clever rogue — how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse

of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his

cleverness.

Very true, he said.

Ελεβέν

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been

severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached

to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are

below — if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the

very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

Τουελβε Θηρτεέν

By all means, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell,1

 but the turning round of a soul passing from a

day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to

be true philosophy?

Quite so.

And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another

consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality? What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

Φουρτεέν

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but

never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say "yes" or "no" when I attempt to

distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may

have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is

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an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is

imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by

painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

Φιφτεέν Σιχτεέν Σεβέντρίν Ειγητεέν 

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and

is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the

extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, or

softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their

mode of operation on this wise — the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily

concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both

hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft?

What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy,

light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that

she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

Νιντεέν Τουέντυ

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity could be

adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger,

there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one

is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and

the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks "What is absolute unity?" This is the way in which

the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and

infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

Νιντεέν Τουέντυ

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavour to persuade

those who are prescribe to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but

they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like

merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the

soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many ways it

conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason

about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument.

You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity

when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not

become lost in fractions.

That is very true.

Τουεντυ ΟΝΕ

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or

taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in

actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question

relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry — whether that tends in any degree to make

more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to

turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to

behold.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

Yes, that is what we assert.

Τουεντυ Τουό

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and

transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and

raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

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Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means

learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind? he said.

Τουεντυ Θρι

Let us do so, he replied.

And suppose we make astronomy the third — what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to

the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting

upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul

which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and re-illumined; and is more precious

far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class

of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be

utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to

be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing

to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your

own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

Τουεντυ Φουρ

First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order,

should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go

on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised

astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that

astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not to me.

And what then would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look

downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked.

Τουεντυ Φιβε Τουεντυ Σεξ Σιχ

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I

dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that

his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in

my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and

whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I

would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not

upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be

learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore,

although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true

motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them

that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended

by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.

Τουέντύ Σεβεν

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the

light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look

on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images

in the water (which are divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light

of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image) — this power of elevating the highest principle in the

soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that

faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible

world — this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been

described.

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I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is

harder still to deny. This, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be

discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed

at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain,2

 and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is

the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths

will also lead to our final rest?

Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should

behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or

would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that

I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

Τουέντύ Ειγητ

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all

true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned

with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the

preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were

saying, have some apprehension of true being — geometry and the like — they only dream about being, but

never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined,

and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the

conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that

such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away

with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an

outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of

conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have

some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our

previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of

such importance to consider?

Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to

call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of

shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a proportion:

As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief,

and understanding to the perception of shadows.

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be

a long enquiry, many times longer than this has been

Τουέντύ Νινε

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying,

is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.

What do you mean?

In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry — I mean, that he should not be half

industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other

bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the

occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of

lameness.

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and

is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and

does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully

distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities States

and individuals unconsciously err and the State makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being

defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

Θηρτυ

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honour and regard for

them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he

would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good

disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honour, which were taught us in

childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.

That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence

those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honourable, and he answers as

the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into

believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just and good any more than the reverse,

and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them as

before?

Impossible.

Θηρτύ Υνω

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and

have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to

their consummation; the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal

light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the, pattern according to which they

are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making

philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public

good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they

have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the

State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public

memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demi-gods, but if not, as in any

case blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying

applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all things like the men.

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the

government is not a mere dream, and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which

has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State, one or more of them,

despising the honours of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things

right and the honour that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all

things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their

own city?